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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This supplement discusses the Commis-
sion's policy in relation to state aids. It 
shows clearly that the Community's 
competition policy is profoundly in-
fluenced by other policy objectives in 
such diverse fields as protection of the 
environment, industrial policy and re-
gional development. In every aid case, 
the Commission is obliged to assess : (a) 
whether the aid addresses a Community 
objective laid down in Article 92, (b) 
whether the aid is an appropriate means 
for contributing to the achievement of 
that objective, and (c) whether the bene-
ficial effects of the aid outweigh the dam-
age which may be caused by distortion of 
competition. 
For the sake of consistency and transpar-
ency, the Commission has adopted a 
number of guidelines and frameworks 
which specify the criteria to be applied in 
carrying out such assessments and im-
pose certain limits on the level of aid 
which may be granted according to the 
objective of the aid, the region concerned 
and other relevant circumstances. These 
frameworks or guidelines therefore have 
to address a matrix of problems. For ex-
ample, the Community objectives of pro-
tnoting SMEs, reducing regional dispari-
ties and restoring the balance between 
demand and supply in "sensitive" sectors 
are common threads which run through 
almost all of the state aid rules. 
However, the relationship between com-
petition policy and other Community po-
licies is reciprocal. In order to maintain 
economic efficiency, the other policies 
have to be implemented in such a way as 
not to give rise to excessive distortions of 
competition. The Community recog-
nises, for example, that the goals of in-
dustrial policy cannot be achieved with-
out an effective competition policy. The 
new Article 130 of the EC Treaty, which 
introduces explicit industrial policy 
goals into the Treaty, stipulates that 
Community action in this field must be 
"in accordance with a system of open 
and competitive markets" and that "This 
Title shall not provide a basis for the 
introduction by the Community of any 
measure which could lead to a distortion 
of competition". 
During the period 1980-1990, covered 
by the Commission's three surveys of 
state aids, there was a declining tendency 
in the total volume of aid. However, the 
economic climate has changed since the 
beginning of the 1990s, with the acces-
sion of the new German Lander, the re-
cession and tougher international com-
petition. In this context the pressure on 
Member States and on the governments 
of non-member countries to adopt more 
interventionist policies is increasing. For 
these reasons, it is very important for the 
Commission to remain vigilant in order 
to counter the danger of a relapse, both at 
home and abroad, into covert protection-
ism by means of state aids. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of subsidies as a policy instrument may hurt econ-
omic welfare by introducing distortions between enterprises 
within one sector, between sectors, regions or countries. 
However modem industrial economics has stressed the point 
that in the presence of market failures subsidies can, in theory, 
restore efficiency. Decisions on subsidies therefore require 
both theoretical and empirical evaluation. 
Surveillance and control of State aids have from the begin-
ning of the Communities been transferred to the Commun-
ity level. The concept of state aid in the Treaty of Rome is 
very broad and covers not only direct grants, but also low 
rates of interest, deferment of tax liabilities, and in general 
any gratuitous advantage. In principle, State aids which 
distort trade between Member States, are forbidden unless 
a derogation is accorded specifically. To allow effective 
control, the Member States have to notify the Commission 
of measures which could constitute State aid. However, the 
application of these principles has required a large body of 
derived legislation, in particular Commission guidelines. 
These guidelines can be divided into two main categories: 
horizontal and sectoral. 
For those subsidies which are subject to Community rules, 
the Commission has by means of surveys on State aids 
published in 1988, 1990 and 1992 established a degree of 
transparency. 
I. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF STATE AIDS 
Subsidies are an instrument by which public authorities influ-
ence behaviour by changing the relative prices which pro-
ducers, consumers and suppliers of factors of production face. 
The effects of subsidies can be classified in the following 
main groups : changes brought about in the conditions of 
competition within a given product market, shifts in the al-
location of resources between products or factors of produc-
tion, competition between regions, the impact on public fi-
nances and the reactions of trading partners. 
1. Changes in the conditions of competition 
It is obvious that, by artificially improving the competitive 
position of certain enterprises, a subsidy can enable them 
to increase or maintain their market shares at the expense 
of other enterprises which do not benefit from aid. The 
conditions of competition are altered even if the subsidy is 
not reflected in the price of the product; the competitive 
position of a firm is also strengthened, for example, if an 
aid enables it to pursue a more aggressive strategy or re-
duce its indebtedness. As a consequence, more efficient 
firms can be forced to limit their output to sub-optimal le-
vels or, in extreme cases, even to withdraw from the 
market. The competition effects of subsidies can therefore 
have important macroeconomic implications by reducing 
economic efficiency and hence total output (GDP). 
At this point it is interesting to note that an analogy can be 
drawn between state aids and anti-competitive behaviour 
by firms. If, as a result either of inadequate anti-trust mech-
anisms or of deliberate government policy, firms are able 
to indulge in anti-competitive practices in their home 
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markets ( e.g. forming cartels or abusing dominant market 
positions), the effects are in many ways similar to those of 
an aid, with the difference that the costs are borne by the 
firms' customers rather than the taxpayers. Imports into the 
home market may be restricted and the firms' ability to 
penetrate other markets will be strengthened. Hence, there 
is a clear need for Community control not only over aid 
under Articles 92 to 94 EEC but also over anti-competitive 
practices by firms under Articles 85 to 87 and over mergers 
under the Merger Regulation. 
In carrying out its duties under Articles 92 to 94 of the EEC 
Treaty, the Commission is concerned only with the aids 
which create or threaten to create distortions of trade be-
tween Member States. Trade distortion is primarily cross-
border competition distortion, although it may also result 
from a shift in resource allocation, e.g. when a subsidy in-
creases the consumption of a domestically-produced prod-
uct at the expense of an imported substitute. 
The restriction of the scope of the Commission's authority to 
state aids which create trade distortions is unlikely in practice 
to exclude any major aids, since economic integration in the 
Community has already reached an advanced level and is still 
progressing. A much more significant restriction on the Com-
mission's powers is the stipulation in Article 92( I) that the 
state aid rules apply only to aids which favour "certain un-
dertakings or the production of certain goods", i.e. that 
measures which apply equally to all finns in all sectors and 
regions are not subject to control. Such measures would in-
clude, for example, generally applicable national rules on cor-
porate taxation or employers' social security contributions 1. 
2. Shifts in resource allocation 
Under Articles 92-94 EC the Commission therefore has to 
focus on aids which favour individual firms or firms in spe-
cific sectors or regions and which distort intra-Community 
competition or threaten to do so. If we focus too narrowly 
on the competition issues, however, we may overlook the 
implications of state aid~ for resource allocation and thus, 
perhaps, underestimate the dangers which subsidies pres-
ent for economic efficiency. Resource allocation is affected 
when a subsidy results in over-production and over-con-
sumption of a given product as compared to an ideally effi-
cient economy. For example, if we subsidise coal, this has 
repercussions on the levels of production, consumption, 
employment and investment in all other parts of the energy 
sector. It may be argued that a coal subsidy is needed to 
compensate for distortions in other parts of the energy 
market which give an unfair advantage to other energy 
sources. However, to use the subsidy instrument rather 
than to deal directly with the original distortions is to intro-
duce a new distortion which artificially increases the con-
sumption of energy in general. 
Subsidies can also distort the allocation of factors of pro-
duction. For example, many aids are granted for fixed in-
vestment rather than labour. Capital-intensive firms will 
tend to receive a large share of such aids, which may also 
encourage more labour-intensive firms to increase their 
capital/labour ratios to sub-optimal levels. 
- ---
1 If the Commission considers that these measures cause important 
distortions. it may make proposals for harmonisation under Artie Jes 
100-102 EC. 
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3. Impact on public finance and income redistribution II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AID AND INDUS-
TRIAL POLICY 
From the macro-economic point of view, the control of state 
aids also has a place in the efforts to achieve economic and 
monetary union. State aids represent a small but not insignifi-
cant proportion of public spending in Member States (averag-
ing 4.3% in the period 1988-1990). Member States therefore 
have an interest in limiting aid expenditure as part of the gen-
eral effort to restrain budget deficits and public debt in order 
to meet the convergence targets which are a precondition for 
monetary union under the Maastricht Treaty. 
Another aspect which should not be neglected, although it 
is primarily the concern of the Member States rather than 
the Commission, is the question of equity. The granting of 
state aids is a form of income redistribution (from the 
taxpayers to the beneficiaries of the aid). Ideally, therefore, 
Member States should scrutinise each of their aids care-
fully to determine whether the aid and the additional tax 
needed to finance it bring the economy closer to or further 
away from the politically desirable distribution. 
4. Uncontrolled competition between regions 
Community control of state aids is also important in the con-
text of the Community's objective of achieving economic and 
social cohesion. In uncontrolled competition between regions 
of the Community to influence enterprises' choice of loca-
tion, there would be a tendency towards a general "bidding 
up" of levels of regional aid as public authorities come under 
pressure to match or surpass the aid granted in other areas. In 
such a contest, the more prosperous Member States would al-
ways be able to outbid the less developed Member States. 
The priority objective of economic and social cohesion re-
quires therefore a strict control of State aid in the most pros-
perous areas. The impact of aid approved for the development 
of the less favoured regions has not to be offset by large 
amounts of aid distributed in richer areas. 
5. The reaction of trading partners 
In the context of the Community's relations with its trading 
partners, it is an important task of the Commission to keep 
a close watch on the subsidies being granted to enterprises 
by non-Community countries. However, it is also necess-
ary to give careful consideration to the danger that certain 
aid measures within the Community may provoke retaliat-
ory action and to take account of the Community's obliga-
tions under international agreements. Several such agree-
ments, to which the Community is a party, contain 
provisions on the granting of state aids. These include the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the OECD Un-
derstanding on export credits, the Europe Agreements with 
Eastern European countries and the agreement on the Euro-
pean Economic Area. 
Articles 61--63 of the latter agreement transpose the main 
state aid rules of the Community to the EEA level, so that the 
Commission is now obliged to consider the impact of aids on 
competition throughout the Area. In the EFfA countries 
which are parties to the agreement, the competition rules are 
enforced by the new EFfA Surveillance Authority, which 
also has to consider the interests of the whole Area. 
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the disad-
vantages of state aids. However, since perfect competition 
is a theoretical construct rather than a reality, there are cases 
where strong arguments can be put forward in support of 
government intervention. Many of the arguments in sup-
port of State aid are precisely the same as those which are 
advanced more generally in favour of government inter-
vention under the heading of "industrial policy". Indeed, 
throughout the Community state aids are a significant in-
strument for achieving the goals of industrial policy, es-
pecially in the following fields : support for "infant in-
dustries", research and development, vocational training, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, industrial restructur-
ing. These arguments can be classified under the general 
heading of market imperfections. 
The most commonly mentioned type of market imperfec-
tion occurs in the presence of externalities. Externalities 
are said to exist when an activity undertaken by an individ-
ual or firm has a spill-over effect on others which is not 
properly reflected in the market prices. There is therefore 
a difference between the private costs and benefits, which 
determine the individual activities, and the costs and bene-
fits from the point of view of society as a whole. These ex-
ternal effects may be negative or positive. 
An obvious example of a negative externality is air or 
water pollution. In the absence of an effective system for 
applying the "polluter-pays" principle, e.g. through regula-
tion, taxation or tradable emission licences, the only feas-
ible way to reduce pollution may be to offer subsidies for 
less-polluting products or production methods. 
As examples of positive externalities we can take research 
and development or vocational training. Unless a firm un-
dertaking R&D can completely protect all the results of its 
work, there are likely to be some spill-over benefits for 
other firms. When assessing the costs and benefits of a re-
search proposal, however, the firm will not take these spill-
overs into account. Consequently, the total R&D effort is 
likely to be less than the social optimum. Similarly, the 
vocational training efforts of an individual firm increase 
the total pool of skilled labour available to other firms. At 
the limit, some firms can be total "free riders" in this re-
spect, relying on attracting skilled labour from other 
employers while spending nothing on training. Other 
firms, finding that the benefits which they derive from 
training their personnel do not correspond to the costs, may 
reduce the resources allocated to training. In such cases. 
therefore, there may again be a justification for subsidies. 
perhaps financed by para-fiscal levies. 
Market imperfections also exist because of uncertainty. 
Perfect information is never available about the present 
and future prices of all goods and factors of production. 
Uncertainty means risk and risk-averse financial markets 
will be biased against new activities ("infant industries'') 
where the degree of uncertainty is high. They will also be 
reluctant to invest in an activity if the projected pay-back 
period is long, because uncertainty increases with time. As 
a result, it can be argued that such activities would not be 
sufficiently undertaken without government intervention, 
particularly in the form of subsidies. However, the effec-
tive use of subsidies in such situations requires that govern-
ment should possess better information and greater fore-
sight than private lenders and investors, in other words, 
that government should be good at "picking winners". In 
the words of Paul Krugman : "It is in fact easy to offer a 
justification for industrial policy ... The difficult questions 
are how to implement such a policy in practice, and how 
to manage the political economy of such a policy in such 
a way us to avoid the usual mistakes". 
This problem of imperfect information and risk-averse fi-
nancial markets has also been identified as one of the major 
problems besetting small and medium-sized enterprises. 
SMEs often have difficulty in raising finance because they 
can offer less security to lenders than big firms and because 
reliable information about their past performance and fu-
ture prospects is less readily available. Consequently, for 
example, banks may consider that the cost of carrying out 
a thorough appraisal of an SME's loan application is sim-
ply not justified by the amount of new business involved. 
Because of their limited administrative resources, SMEs 
may also suffer from a lack of information about their exist-
ing and potential markets, or the possibilities for linking up 
with other firms. Assistance to SMEs has therefore become 
an important element in the industrial policies of the Com-
munity and the Member States. 
Finally, we should mention the market imperfections which 
can be classified under the general heading of imperfect mo-
bility of factors of production. The geographic mobility of 
labour, for example, is limited and it is not certain that the re-
sults would be entirely desirable if there were perfect mobility 
( depopulation of peripheral areas and excessive concentration 
in the central areas). It is also important to bear in mind that 
the geographic distribution of economic activities does not 
necessarily correspond to the present pattern of comparative 
advantages but is a product of history. Consequently, there are 
strong arguments in favour of a regional policy including a 
judicious use of subsidies. The need for action to rectify re-
gional imbabmces is recognised in the Community's "cohe-
sion" objective and the associated measures undertaken by 
the Community's financial instruments, such as the Regional 
Fund and the EIB. 
Another aspect of imperfect mobility of production factors is 
revealed in the frictional problems which arise when a firm 
is no longer viable or when a sector needs to be restructured. 
The factors of production "liberated" by factory closures can-
not be transferred overnight to some new activity and serious 
unemployment problems can arise. In such cases also there 
can be a justification for state aid in order to ease the transition 
to a new structure of economic activity. 
III. PRESENTATION OF SURVEYS ON STATE 
AID (Commission of the European Communities, 
1988, 1990, 1992) 
General patterns of State aid 
In three surveys published in 1989, 1990 and 1992, the 
Commission presented elements of quantification of state 
aid by Member States. These surveys cover only measures 
which constitute state aids subject to Community rules. 
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The third survey found that in 1988-1990, state aids to all 
sectors amounted to ECU 89 billion per year, which repre-
sents 2.0% of the Community's GDP. However, in certain 
Member States, state aids are over 2.8% of national GDP. 
40% more than the EC average: Belgium (2.8% ), Greece 
(3.1%), Italy (2.9%), Luxembourg (4%). In other Member 
States they represent less than 1.6% of national GDP (Den-
mark, Netherlands and United Kingdom). The importance of 
state aids can also be seen from the fact that they are 4.3% of 
total general government expenditure which is more than the 
revenue generated from direct taxation of enterprises. In some 
Member States, state aid represents over 5.0% of public 
spending (Belgium, Gennany, Greece. Italy, Luxembourg 
and Portugal) while the proportion is less than 3.7% in others 
(Denmark, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom). 
TABLE I: Total state aid by Member State (average 1988-1990) 
In '/c of GDP In ECU per In '!c of total 
employed person public spending 
---- ------ --
B 2.8 ]040 5.4 
DK 1.1 409 1.9 
D 2.4 971 5.2 
GR 3.1 387 6.0 
E 1.8 480 4.2 
F 1.8 735 .n 
IRL 2.0 564 4.5 
I 2.9 982 5.6 
L 4.0 1389 7.6 
NL 1.3 528 " 0 
p 2.2 245 5.0 
UK I.I 312 2.9 
EUR-12 2.0 687 4.3 
- - ---
- --- - -
So11/"/"t : Third Survey on State Aids in the European Community. 
Commission. 1992. 
It is interesting to note that the countries where there is a 
high level of state aid (Italy, Belgium, Greece) are also 
countries where the public deficit is very high. In Italy, the 
financing of state aid corresponds to 28c1o of the public defi-
cit, in Belgium to44% of this deficit, and 45% for Portugal: 
a stricter control of state aids could therefore contribute to 
the reduction of public deficits and enhance the prospects 
for these countries to fulfil the convergence criteria for 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
The significance of aids can also be highlighted in terms of 
ECU per employee. Luxembourg ( 1389 ECU) has an ex-
penditure much higher than the other large aid givers: Bel-
gium(l 040), Italy (982) and Germany (971). On the other 
side, Denmark (409), Greece (387), Portugal (245) and the 
United Kingdom (312) appear to be relatively small aid 
givers. These small aid givers include two countries with 
low GDP per head compared to the Community average, 
which means that even if State aid in terms of percentage 
of GDP is high, the volume in ECU per head is low. In the 
case of Denmark and the United Kingdom, state interven-
tion is weak both in % of GDP and in monetary terms. 
Manufacturing industry 
In the period 1988-90 covered by the third survey, aids to 
manufacturing amounted to 40% of total state aid compare to 
29% for transport, 18% for coal and 13% for agriculture and 
fisheries. Manufacturing is therefore the first recipient of state 
aid except in the United Kingdom and Germany where coal 
played a major role (32% of total state aid in Gennany and 
42% in United Kingdom) and in Luxembourg where trans-
port is first. On the other hand, state aid to manufacturing 
represents 73% of total aid in Greece, 60% in Ireland and 
68% in Portugal. The less developed countries of the Com-
munity in terms of GDP per head are also countries where 
state aid to manufacturing is very important. In conclusion, 
isolating the manufacturing sector shows that aid is in fact 
very important to this sector, and represents a greater percen-
tage of value added than in the economy in general, more than 
3.2% of value added in the recent period. 
TABLE 2 : Total state aid by Member State 1988-1990 
(broken down into main sectors) 
Agriculture Manufacuring Transport Coal Total & fisheries 
B 6 32 35 28 100 
DK 27 31 42 0 100 
D ll 31 26 32 100 
GR 14 73 13 0 100 
E 4 42 35 19 100 
F 14 38 31 17 100 
IRL 20 60 20 0 100 
I 15 49 36 0 100 
L 7 19 74 0 100 
NL 21 48 31 0 100 
p 20 68 11 100 
UK 10 38 10 42 100 
EUR-12 13 40 29 18 100 
Source : Third Survey on State Aids in the European Community, 
Commission. 1992. 
Table 3 compares the average yearly amounts given as state 
aid to manufacturing in the period 1986-1990. It can be 
seen that the volume of aid in EUR-12 has declined in real 
term by 17% between 1986 and 1990. The lowest point was 
reached in 1989 but the following year saw an increase of 
5%. At the end of the 80's, the level was still below that of 
1981-1982, but it is not clear if this trend could not be rev-
ersed in 1992 and 1993 with the recession and the pressure 
from sectors with overcapacity 1• 
Trade in manufacturing products accounts for the bulk of 
activities engaged in intra-Community trade, which ex-
plains why special attention is needed in this sector, where 
the distortive effects of subsidies could have a strong cross-
border impact. In figures 1 and 2, State aid to the manufac-
turing sector has been expressed both in terms of percen-
tage of value added in the sector and in Ecu per employee. 
TABLE 3 : Aid to the manufacturing sector in the Community 
(annual amounts from l 986 to 1990) 
-----
EUR-12 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
In % of value added 4.2 3.7 4.0 3.2 3.3 
In Ecu I per person employed 1383 1225 1360 1100 1152 
1 At constant 1989 prices. 
Source : Third Survey on State Aid in the European Community, 
Commission, 1992. 
The results obtained here are quite comparable to those ob-
served for the total economy. Whilst it is dangerous to im-
pute distortions of competition from global aid figures, the 
differences among countries are so marked that it is necess-
ary to have a strict control in order to establish if such huge 
1 The Commission's fourth survey, covering the period up to 1992, 
should be published this year. 
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differences in aid can be objectively justified, having re-
gard to their distortive effects on competition. In nearly all 
Member States certain sectors have in general been very 
highly aided : steel, shipbuilding, the hard coal industry. 
GRAPH 1 : State aid to the manufacturing sector 
(annual averages 1988-1990) 
In percent of value added 
GR I P IRL B E EUR-12 F NL L D DK UK 
Source : Third Survey on State Aids in the European Community, 
Commission, 1992. 
GRAPH 2 : State aid to the manufacturing sector 
(annual averages 1988-1990) 
In ecu per person employed 
I IRL B GR F NL L EUR-12 D E P DK UK 
Source : Third Survey on State Aids in the European Community, 
Commission, 1992. 
Table 4 shows for instance aids to shipbuilding as a percen-
tage of gross value added in 1981-1985 and 1988-1990. 
In this sector, aids are significant, and represent more than 
one third of value added. Moreover this share has increased 
substantially between 1981-1985 and 1988-1990 in Ger-
many (from 12.3% to 25.1 %) in Italy (from 34.2% to 
84.8%) in Netherlands (from 10.7% to 23.4%). 
Type of interventions 
Grants have formed the bulk of interventions in many 
Member States: Spain (78% ), United Kingdom (78% ), 
Luxembourg (75%), Netherlands (66%), Denmark (59%). 
Tax reductions were important in Germany (61 % ), notably 
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for regional development purposes (Berlin), in Ireland (44%) 
and in Italy ( 40% ). On average, grants or tax relief (group A) 
are predominant in all Member states with the exception of 
Portugal (64% for other types of aids), France (56%) and to 
some extent Greece ( 40%) and Denmark (37% ). 
TABLE 4 : Aid to shipbuilding 1988-1990 and 1986-1988 
(in % of value added in the sector1l 
1981-1985 1988-1990 
B 27.7 14.5 
DK 33.8 33.4 
D 12.3 25.l 
GR n.a. 13.0 
E n.a. 34.1 
F 56.6 55.0 
I 34.2 84.8 
NL l0.7 23.4 
p n.a. 78.6 
UK 21.6 10.8 
1 As value added figures were not always available for recent years, some 
estimates had to be made. The figures should therefore be regarded as 
estimates. 
Source · Third Survey on State Aid in the European Community. 
Commission, 1992. 
Capital injections involve aids when the historic performance 
of the companies concerned and their level of indebtedness 
would have deterred a private investor from making the in-
vestment. Equity participation has formed a significant form 
of aid in Portugal (59% ), in Greece ( 18% ), in France ( 11 % ) 
and in Spain (10%). Equity participations were very often in 
these countries intended to cover the losses of state-owned 
companies. With the privatisation process, there may be a 
tendency in the long run for equity participation to diminish 
as an instrument of aid in comparison of other forms of inter-
ventions. However, in the short term, there may actually be 
an increase in such interventions as governments may be 
tempted to re-capitalise heavily indebted public enterprises in 
order to make them more attractive to potential buyers. 
The aid element of soft loans or tax deferrals is an import-
ant part of aid in Denmark (37%) and is also of some sig-
nificance in France ( 17%) and Luxembourg ( 16% ). The aid 
element of guarantees is a significant part of aid only in 
France and to a lesser extent Greece ( 11 % ). These guaran-
tees are often associated with trade/export. 
TABLE 5 : State aid to the manufacturing sector 1988-1990 
(breakdown by type of aid in % ) 
Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
---·~ ----~ 
---
Tax Equity Soft Tax Grants 
relief (partic1pa- loans; Defer- Guarmitees 
tion) rn!s 
B 55 27 5 5 0 8 100 
DK 59 3 0 37 0 0 lOO 
D 28 61 0 7 3 100 
GR 44 17 18 II 0 11 100 
E 78 0 10 II () l 100 
F 28 16 II 14 3 28 100 
IRL 50 44 2 0 0 3 100 
I 53 40 5 2 () () 100 
L 75 5 2 16 0 100 
NL 66 27 () 4 0 3 100 
p 34 3 59 4 () I 100 
UK 78 4 8 3 6 I 100 
EUR-12 47 32 7 7 2 6 100 
Source· Third Survey on State Aid in the European Community. 
Commission, 1992. 
Objectives of aid 
The proportion of the total aid element in each Member 
State according to the various objectives is presented in 
table 6. The most immediate conclusion is that regional ob-
jectives and horizontal objectives predominate. 
Horizontal aids include schemes such as support for research 
and development, small and medium enterprises, export sub-
sidies, and general investment aid not formally targeted on 
specific sectors. Sectoral aids include schemes targeted on 
particular industries and ad hoe aids for individual firms. Res-
cue and restructuring aids constitute a large part of this cat-
egory. Among the horizontal aid schemes, the most important 
subcategories in term of expenditure are : trade subsidies, 
SMEs, innovation and R&D (around 10% each for EC). 
However there are large differences among the different 
countries : R&D is very important in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, SMEs in Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, export subsidies in Greece, France and Ireland. 
Sectoral aids accounts for very high proportions of the total 
in Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. As previously re-
marked, sectoral aids go mainly to steel and shipbuilding. 
TABLE 6: State aid to the manufacturing sector 1988-1990 (breakdown by sector and function) 
-
Sectors/[ unction B DK D GR 
---~~-----~-~~--~~~-
Horizontal objectives 76 59 29 81 
Innovation R&D 13 35 12 
S.M.E. 25 l 7 10 
Export subsidies 14 8 2 22 
General investment 12 0 0 10 
Other objectives 8 0 2 37 
Sectoral aids 4 38 11 56 
Shipbuilding 32 3 3 
Regional objectives 21 3 61 IS 
Total 100 100 100 100 
---------
Source Third Survey on State Aid in the European Community, Commission, 1992. 
IV. COMMUNITY GUIDELINES 
The general principles of state aid control are laid down in 
the EEC and ECSC Treaties and in the EEA agreement, but 
the practical application of these principles in many cases 
requires much more detailed rules, sometimes in the form 
----~---·---------~-
E F IRL L NL p UK EUR-12 
28 66 50 30 39 77 17 45 42 
9 17 4 4 8 35 I 8 10 
s 11 8 10 21 31 0 12 10 
I 36 38 8 2 0 15 11 
5 0 2 8 4 9 3 
6 () 0 7 0 0 14 0 5 
67 25 9 15 0 11 78 20 20 
10 4 0 4 0 7 27 7 s 
s 9 42 55 61 12 5 34 38 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
------~---·----------
of derived legislation. These rules serve, firstly, to ensure 
that the Commission has adequate information for the 
assessment of the aids, secondly, to define the circum-
stances in which the Commission may consider that aid is 
compatible with the common market, and, thirdly, to estab-
lish limits to the amount of aid that may be granted. 
In the agricultural, fisheries and transport sectors, some 
aids are exempted from the provisions of Articles 92-94 
EC. In agriculture and fisheries, the exemption applies 
only to aids covered by specific Council regulations under 
Article 42 EC. Such regulations usually contain very pre-
cise rules concerning the amounts of aid and the circum-
stances in which it may be granted. In the transport sector, 
aids are exempted from the normal competition rules if 
they "meet the needs of coordination of transport" or if they 
compensate for "public service obligations" (Article 77 
EC). Secondary legislation 1 was needed to define these 
concepts. In the coal and steel sectors, on the other hand, 
the secondary legislation in effect substitutes new rules for 
the very strict prohibition of aid contained in Article 4 of 
the ECSC Treaty. 
In other areas of state aid policy, which present special 
problems or where an exceptionally favourable attitude to 
aids is adopted, the Commission has felt the need for a for-
mal systematisation of its approach by means of published 
guidelines, taking account of the relevant case law. In 
drawing up its legislative proposals and guidelines, the 
Commission has to take into account not only the impact 
of state aids on the conditions of competition but also Com-
munity objectives in other fields, such as regional, social 
and industrial policy. 
The secondary legislation and Commission guidelines can 
be divided into three main groups: horizontal, regional and 
sectoral. In cases where more than one set of rules apply, 
the more restrictive rules are generally decisive. A feature 
common to many of these rules, whether horizontal, re-
gional or sectoral, is a negative attitude towards operating 
aids which are deemed to be conservative in their effects 
and not likely to lead to a lasting solution to the problems 
that they address. 
Horizontal guidelines 
The horizontal guidelines set out rules which apply gen-
erally to all sectors of the economy covered by Articles 92 
to 94 EEC (i.e. excluding ECSC sectors, much of agricul-
ture and fisheries and part of the transport sector). These 
guidelines concern aids for particular purposes, such as 
environmental protection, R&D, the promotion of SMEs 
etc., and also particular forms of aid, such as state guaran-
tees and public authorities' equity holdings. Only guide-
lines of the first type will be discussed here. 
Aid for environmental purposes 
The Commission published its first, rudimentary frame-
work for environmental aids in 1974. However, as the pol-
itical importance of environmental protection grew so did 
the size and complexity of the aid schemes implemented by 
the Member States. The Commission gradually developed 
a policy for controlling these schemes but this was not fully 
codified until 1993, when the Commission adopted its 
"Community guidelines on state aid for environmental 
protection"2. 
1 Notably. Council Regulations (EEC) N°5 . 1191/69, 1192/69 (O.J. 
n° L156 of 28.6.69) and 1107/70 (0.J. n° Ll30 of 15.6.1970) as 
amended by Regulation 1473/75 (O.J. n° L152 of 12.6.75). 
2 OJ. nQ C 72 of 10.3.94, page 3. 
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The Commission's long-term objective is to extend consider-
ably the application of the "polluter pays" principle, i.e. the 
principle that those who cause environmental damage should 
be forced, through taxation or other means, to bear the costs 
which they would otherwise impose on the rest of society. 
However, in the words of the guidelines, "Both positive fi-
nancial incentives, i.e. subsidies, and disincentives, namely 
taxes and levies, have their place". However, subsidies are re-
garded as "a second-best solution in situations where the pol-
luter pays principle ... is not yet fully applied". 
The guidelines cover all types of aids which are commonly 
used as instruments of environmental policy, including no-
tably aid for investment in equipment to reduce or eliminate 
pollution and incentives for the purchase of environmentally 
friendly products. Aid for investments in energy-saving tech-
nology and the use of renewable energy sources is also cov-
ered by the guidelines. 
The most detailed rules in the guidelines relate to invest-
ment aids. These rules distinguish between, on one hand, 
investments which are made to comply with legally obliga-
tory norms and, on the other hand, investments which go 
beyond these norms or which are made entirely voluntarily 
in the absence of any legal norm. In principle, the eligible 
investment costs must be strictly confined to the extra costs 
incurred in meeting environmental objectives. In practice, 
however, this rule may be difficult to apply in some cases. 
Where the investment merely enables the firm to adapt to 
legal requirements, aid is limited to 15% of the eligible in-
vestment cost (25% in the case of small and medium-sized 
enterprises). Such aid may only be granted for adapting 
plant which has been in operation for at least two years at 
the time when new legal requirements enter into force. 
Where the investment exceeds legal requirements, or 
where no legally enforceable norms are applicable, the aid 
intensity may be up to 30% (40% for SMEs). In assisted 
areas where the Commission has authorised higher rates of 
regional aid, the higher regional limits apply. 
The purchase of environmentally friendly products by final 
consumers may be subsidised provided that there is no dis-
crimination as to the origin of the products and that the sub-
sidy does not exceed the extra cost of meeting the environ-
mental objective. 
Research and development 
In the field of research and development, the Commission is-
sued in 1986 a "Community framework for state aids for re-
search and development"3. In Article l 30f of the EEC Treaty, 
the Community set itself the objective of improving its in-
ternational competitiveness by strengthening the scientific 
and technological basis of its industry. Furthermore, as we 
have argued in the introduction, there are important positive 
externalities involved in R&D. Consequently, this Commun-
ity framework is generally favourable towards aid in this 
field. 
The framework distinguishes between basic and applied re-
search, basic research being theoretical and experimental 
work not leading directly to new products or production pro-
cesses. For basic research, aid up to 50% of the total cost is 
normally allowed. For applied R&D or pilot projects, the per-
mitted rate of aid depends on the distance from the market but 
3 OJ. n° C 83 of 11 April 1986. 
is typically limited to a maximum of 25%. SMEs, finns in 
the least favoured regions and projects of special importance 
for the Community may receive additional aid of up to I 0 
percentage points. Although the Commission is normally 
prepared to give a general authorisation for schemes which 
comply with these rules without requiring notification of each 
individual case of application, aid for very large projects 
(costing more than 20 MECU) must receive individual prior 
approval from the Commission. 
SMEs 
Support for SMEs is the subject of very detailed guidelines 
published in 1992 1• This document acknowledges the im-
portance of SMEs for employment creation, for the flexi-
bility of the economy and for innovation but notes that they 
are in some respects at a disadvantage by comparison with 
larger firms, e.g. difficulties in raising finance, high costs 
of compliance with government regulations. The guide-
lines therefore outline a fairly favourable approach to aid 
for SMEs. In particular, aid may be given to support invest-
ment by SMEs throughout the Community, whereas larger 
firms may only receive investment aid for projects under-
taken in the assisted regions of the Community. Small 
firms, which are defined as those with up to 50 employees2, 
may receive up to 15% of their investment costs anywhere 
in the Community, while firms with between 50 and 250 
employees3 may receive up to 7 .5%. In assisted regions, 
the normal aid ceilings are raised by up to 15 percentage 
points, depending on the region concerned. 
Rescue and restructuring 
When firms run into difficulties and are threatened with clo-
sure, governments often come under intense pressure to grant 
aid to enable them to survive. In the Commission's terminol-
ogy such aid is referred to as rescue aid when its purpose is 
merely to keep the firm in business and as restructuring aid 
when the objective is to reorganise and rationalise the firm so 
as to restore its viability. Such aids can have harmful effects 
in delaying necessary adaptations to changed market condi-
tions and may result in transferring industrial and social prob-
lems from one Member State to another, particularly in sec-
tors with serious problems of over-capacity. 
Consequently, in guidelines published in 19794, the 
Commission stressed the need for strict control of such 
aids. However, the Commission has to take account of the 
industrial and social impact of factory closures. It may 
therefore be willing to authorise rescue aid provided that it 
is granted only during the time necessary to draw up a re-
covery plan (normally six months are allowed). Further-
more, the aid should be strictly limited to the amount 
needed to keep the firm in business during that period. The 
Commission may approve restructuring aid if the restruc-
turing plan offers good prospects of a return to viability 
within a reasonable time and the aid is no more than is 
needed to support the firm until the plan bears fruit. To al-
------
] Community guidelines on state aid for small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs), O.J. n" C2 l 3 of 19 August 1992. 
2 And either a maximum annual turnover of 5 Mecu or a balance-
sheet total not exceeding 2 Mecu. 
3 And either a maximum annual turnover of 20 Mecu or a balance-
sheet total of not more than I O Mecu. 
4 
''Eighth Report on Competition Policy", point 228. 
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leviate the adverse effects on competitors who do not re-
ceive any aid, the Commission normally requires that the 
beneficiary firm should reduce its production capacity, par-
ticularly when there is chronic over-capacity in the sector 
concerned. 
Public enterprises 
In the context of rescue and restructuring aids it is worth men-
tioning that financial transactions between Member States 
and public enterprises can be extremely complex and difficult 
to control in accordance with the state aid rules. A Commis-
sion Directive of 19805 therefore requires Member States to 
make adequate information on such transactions available to 
the Commission, so that it can judge whether or not state aid 
is involved. Problems arise in particular when a public enter -
prise which is in financial difficulties benefits from a state 
guarantee of its debts or from a capital injection from public 
resources. In such cases, the Commission applies the so-
called "commercial investor principle". According to this 
principle, the provision of finance from public resources to an 
enterprise constitutes a state aid if that firm would not, in the 
given circumstances, be able to obtain finance on the private 
capital markets, or if it could do so only on terms less favour-
able to itself. In many cases when a firm is in difficulties, 
there are good reasons to doubt whether a private investor 
would subscribe to a capital increase or a private banker 
would be willing to grant a guarantee. In these cases the Com-
mission is faced with the difficult task of deciding whether 
the state aid rules apply. 
Regional aid rules 
Community policy explicitly recognises the need for 
public intervention in favour of disadvantaged regions. Ar-
ticle 130a of the EU Treaty states that "the Community 
shall aim at reducing disparities between the various re-
gions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions", 
while Article 92(3) (and Article 61(3) of the EEA agree-
ment) allows the Commission to grant derogations from 
the general prohibition of state aids in the following cases : 
• "aid to promote the development of areas where the stan-
dard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious 
underemployment" (Article 92(3)(a)), 
• "aid to facilitate the development of .... certain economic 
areas" (Article 92(3)(c)). 
Thus, it can be argued that the Treaty implicitly accepts the 
view put forward in section II of this paper that regional 
disparities are instances of market failure that can in some 
circumstances justify the use of state aid. Some econom-
ists, however, contend that regional problems are not evi-
dence of market failure and would argue that the deroga-
tions in favour of regional aids are purely an expression of 
a political preference. 
The tasks of the Commission in relation to regional aid are, 
first, to regulate such aid so as to limit the resulting distortions 
of competition to an acceptable level and, second, to prevent 
the competition between regions to attract investment from 
degenerating into a self-defeating process of bidding-up of 
subsidies. Community policy deals with these problems in 
5 Commission Directive no.80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 (0.J. n" L 
195 of 29.7.1980) as last amended by Commission Directive 
n" 93/83/EEC of 30 September 1993 (0.J. n" L254 of 12.10.93). 
two ways : firstly, by restricting the geographical scope of re-
gional aids to those areas which are genuinely disadvantaged 
and, secondly, by setting limits to the intensity of the aid ac-
cording to the degree of disadvantage suffered by the region. 
The Commission has established criteria for determining 
which regions can benefit from these derogations 1. The 
analysis of the regions' economic situation is normally car-
ried out on the basis of the standard NUTS geographical 
units (Nomenclature of statistical territorial units). 
Regions eligible under sub-paragraph (a) of Article 92(3) 
- the least-favoured regions - are defined as NUTS II re-
gions with a per capita GDP, averaged over the last three 
years, of75% of the Community average or less. There are, 
however, two exceptions to this rule2. In total, the Article 
92(3 )(a) derogation applies to regions containing about 86 
million inhabitants, about one quarter of the total Com-
munity population, including the whole of Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal and the new Lander of Germany. 
By contrast with sub-paragraph (a), sub-paragraph (c) of Ar-
ticle 92(3) is extremely vague about the type of area which 
may benefit from aid. However, the Commission has devel-
oped a method for defining the areas which may benefit from 
this derogation. This method takes account of a region's 
socio-economic situation in relation to the overall situation in 
the Member State concerned but also takes account of the 
wider Community context. The method is in two stages. In 
the first stage, only the regional per capita GDP and unem-
ployment rate are considered. To qualify at this stage, a region 
must have either a per capita GDP at least 15% below the 
national average or an unemployment rate at least 10% 
higher than the national average3. To take account of the 
Community context, the required differentials are widened if 
the Member State concerned is more prosperous or has a 
lower unemployment rate than the Community average. 
If an area does not satisfy the conditions of the first stage, a 
second stage of analysis is undertaken. This takes other socio-
economic indicators into account, such as net migration, de-
pendence on declining sectors, forecasts of impending job 
losses etc. Especially when an area is very close to the thresh-
old values required in the first stage, this further analysis may 
reveal sufficient justification for authorising regional aid. 
If it decides to authorise regional aid under either sub-para-
graph (a) or sub-paragraph (c), the Commission fixes the 
investment aid ceiling for each region individually, accord-
ing to the degree of disadvantage suffered by the region. 
The aid ceiling may be as high as 75% NGE4 in the least-fa-
voured regions. However, mainly because of shortage of 
budgetary resources, the actual rate of aid is usually 
much lower than this. In areas covered by sub-paragraph 
(c), the aid ceiling set by the Commission is not normally 
higher than 30% (and often lower than 20% ). Operating 
aids, i.e. aid for recurrent running costs, are permitted only 
-----
1 "Commission communication on the method for the application of 
Articles 92(3 )(a) and (c) to regional aid", O.J. C2 l 2, 12.8.88, and 
"Commission communication on the method of application of Ar-
ticle 92(3)(a) to regional aid", O.J. Cl 63, 4.7.90. 
2 One is the Spanish province ofTeruel, which is a NUTS level lIJ area 
within a_NUTS II region (Aragon) that does not qualify as a whole 
under this rule. The other is Northern Ireland, because of its special 
problems. 
3 Since regional policy is concerned with long-term problems, the in-
dices used are five-year averages. 
4 Net Grant Equivalent. which takes into account the effect of taxation. 
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in the least-favoured regions and only in exceptional cir-
cumstances, since the Commission considers that such aids 
do not usually contribute towards a permanent improve-
ment of the regional economic situation but rather tend to 
freeze the existing pattern of economic activity. 
Sectoral guidelines 
Special rules apply to the so-called "sensitive sectors", which 
for the most part are mature or declining industries with 
chronic over-capacity, such as steel, shipbuilding and the 
motor vehicle industry. These rules reflect the dual preoc-
cupation with the maintenance of competition in the internal 
market and the need for industrial restructuring. A common 
feature of these rules is a severely restrictive attitude towards 
aid which could lead to increases in production capacity. In 
some sectors such aid is completely forbidden. 
However, the problems of the disadvantaged regions are 
given special consideration and a more favourable attitude 
is generally adopted towards aid given for research and de-
velopment, workers' training, and environmental protec-
tion measures. Aid for restructuring is scrutinised with par-
ticular care and is normally only permitted when there are 
substantial permanent reductions in capacity. 
The Steel Industry 
As 75% of steel consumption is accounted for by two sectors 
(construction/civil engineering, automobiles), the industry is 
highly dependent on the economic situation in these sectors. 
In 1991, the EC accounted for 18.7% of total world produc-
tion, compared with 10.8% for the USA and 14.9% for Japan. 
Since 1980, the EC, Japan and the USA have all slightly lost 
world market share to newly industrialised countries (NICs) 
and Eastern European countries, which have often entered the 
EC market at dumping prices. Central and Eastern European 
countries now hold an estimated 2-5% of the EC market. The 
ratio of exports to production has declined steadily since 1986 
and has been more or less stable around 8% over recent years. 
Thus, the reduction in internal demand was not compensated 
by increased exports. 
The average capacity utilisation in the entire steel sector in 
1992 amounted to 69%. Although national restructuring 
plans for crude steel production, which accounts for most of 
the employment in the sector and has the highest fixed costs, 
have led to a 19% capacity reduction between 1980 and 1986, 
the sub-sector is still marked by 16-23% overcapacity. In-
creased capital intensity in the sector has led to higher produc-
tivity and a decline in employment in the last 20 years. 
The steel sector in the EC is highly concentrated : in 1990, 
almost half of Community production of crude steel was 
produced by 5 companies and the first 15 firms accounted 
for 73%. As the industry has heavy fixed costs, entry 
barriers are high. Moreover a recent tendency to merge 
activities in response to increased competition from 
cheaper imports has exacerbated the competition situation. 
It is clear, therefore, that the steel industry presents special 
problems for both competition and industrial policy. In an 
effort to deal with these problems as far as state aids are 
concerned, the Commission has since 1980 enacted a series 
of decisions commonly known as the "steel aids codes". 
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TABLE 7: Summary of Article 95 decisions 
Company 
CS! (Spain) 
Aid(MECU) 1 
2773 
Main conditions 
2.3 mio t reduction in hot-rolled capacity (-36 
1.4 mio t reduction in liquid steel capacity. 
Aid per t2 
(ECLsi 
1225 
New hot strip mill at Sestao to be delinked from CS!. 
Early closure of hot strip mill at Ansio. 
Level of financial charges not to be reduced below the average level of 
competitors. 
Sidenor (Spain) 507 
142 
420 
379 OOO t reduction in hot-rolled capacity (-27 '/,). 
505 OOO t reduction in liyuid steel capacity. 
1.138 
SEW Freital (Germany) 
EKO-Stahl (Germany) 
ILVA (italy) 
160 OOO t reduction in hot-rolled capacity (--47 'ic). 
100 OOO t reduction in crude steel capacity. 
887 
462 OOO t reduction in hot-rolled capacity4. 909 
Aid must not result in financial charge~ ic<.;s them 3.5 ex of turnover. 
2537 1.7 mio t reduction in hot-rolled capacity (-14 'k). 1492 
If proceeds from privatisation arc greater than foreseen, the extra receipts 
must he used to reduce the amount of aid. 
The financial charges of the (privatised) succe.ssor companies must not he 
reduced below the level of competitors 
Siderurgia Nacional (Portugal) 305 140 OOO t reduction in hot-rolled capacity (-16 '/,). 217'! 
1 Amounts covered hy the Article 95 decision. Varying amounls of other aid. nolably for social cos;t~. can be authori~ed under the Steel Aid Code and do not rL·quire a 
spcc ial decision. 
Aid per tonne of reduction in capacity to produce hot-rolled products. 
3 New capacity of 1 mio t lo be built at Sestao is not taken into account. 
4 Part of the aid i~ for construction of a new mill with a capacity of 0.9 mio t. I Iowcvcr. the Commis~ion decided that in Eastern German) the g.lohal net capacitJ 
reduction can be taken into account. 
The code currently in force 1 makes no concessions to the 
pressure to allow aid in order to counter suspected dumping 
by Eastern European and Asian producers. This problem is 
dealt with under the Community's trade policy and anti-
dumping regulations. Operating aid is strictly forbidden by 
the code. However, the code does allow aid to be granted for 
R&D in accordance with the nonnal rules and it also contains 
special provisions pennitting limited aid for environmental 
protection and plant closures. Investment aid may be granted 
only in Greece, Portugal and the new Lander of Gennany and 
then on! y if the aided investment does not lead to an increase 
in capacity. In Portugal, eligibility for investment aid is re-
stricted to SMEs, while in Eastern Gennany approval for aid 
is conditional on substantial cuts in total capacity. 
The combined effect of strict aids codes and extensive ra-
tionalisation has been a substantial fall in the amount of aid 
granted to the industry in most Member States. Between 
1988 and 1990 average annual subsidies to the national steel 
industries have varied in the Member States from zero (B, 
DK, IRL, L) to 727 million ECU in the case of Italy. Com-
pared with the annual average for the period 1986-1988, this 
meant a decline of 80% in the case of Britain, 35% in Ger-
many and 15% in Spain. Only Portugal, taking advantage of 
the special status which it enjoyed until the end of 1991, and 
Italy had significantly increased their aid to the steel industry, 
while France's average remained roughly unchanged. 
In 1992 the Commission was notified of six major restruc-
turing plans for publicly owned steel companies, involving 
large amounts of state aid. These cases concerned two com-
panies in Spain (CSI and Sidenor), two in Germany (SEW 
Freital and EKO-Stahl), ILVA in Italy and Siderurgia Na-
cional in Portugal 2. None of these cases could be approved 
under the Steel Aids Code, which sets very narrow limits 
to the possibilities for granting aid. 
- ---
1 Commission Decision n" 3855/91 /ECSC of 27 November 1991 
(0.J. n" L 362 of31.12.1991). 
2 SEW Freital. EKO-Stahl, ILVA and Sideruriia Nacional are to be 
privatised. A buyer has already been found tor one of the two Ger-
man firms. 
However, in each case, after negotiating appropriate adjust-
ments to the plans with the Member States concerned. the 
Commission considered that the plans could make a suffi-
cient contribution to Community objectives to justify the 
granting of state aid to ease the restructuring process. In par-
ticular, the revised plans provided for substantial reductions 
in capacity for producing hot-rolled products, which account 
for 70% of the Community's total finished steel products (by 
weight). The Community-wide over-capacity in this sub-sec-
tor was estimated in 1992 as about 26 million tonnes/year 
(15% of capacity). Consequently,in April 1994. after long ne-
gotiations to obtain the Council's unanimous assent as re-
quired by the ECSC Treaty, the Commission adopted special 
decisions approving aid under Article 95 ECSC. 
Planned or completed reductions in hot-rolled production 
capacity by private sector firms amount to about 15 million 
tonnes/year and the additional reductions linked to the six 
cases now under consideration amount to 5.5 million 
tonnes/year. The amounts of aid and the main conditions 
attached thereto are summarised in Table 7. The Commis-
sion attempted to strike a balance between the amounts of 
aid authorised and the size of the capacity reduction. How-
ever, as the last column of the table shows, after allowance 
was made for special circumstances. there was a wide vari-
ation in the amount of aid per tonne of capacity reduction. 
The aid per tonne for the Portuguese company (SN) is by 
far the highest. The reasons for this are that SN is the only 
Portuguese steel firm and that it has only two plants. The 
present capacity is quite small and any reduction in excess 
of that foreseen in the restructuring plan would necessitate 
closing one of the plants entirely. Both plants are situated 
in areas of high unemployment. 
A special feature of the EKO-Stahl case is that the proposed 
aid is partly intended to help finance the constrnction of a new 
hot strip mill with a capacity of 900000 tonnes/year. The 
Commission allows this only because total capacity in east-
ern Gennany as a whole is to be reduced by a net amount of 
462000 tonnes/year in addition to capacity reductions already 
taken into account for the authorisation of aid to other finns. 
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In the case of the Spanish firm CSI, the Commission has 
agreed to consider that the reduction in capacity will be 2.3 
million tonnes/year, even though CSI will be a minority 
shareholder in a firm which is to build a new hot strip mill 
at Sestao with a capacity of I million t/y. 
In the Commission's view, the decisions achieve a satisfac-
tory balance between the amounts of aid to be authorised 
and the capacity reductions to be achieved. However, the 
decisions have met with a hostile reception from the private 
sector, which has demanded as a condition for agreeing to 
additional capacity reductions on its part that there should 
be no further authorisations of similar aids. 
The Car Industry 
The European car industry is undergoing restructuring in 
the face of three major challenges : a slump in demand, 
competition from more efficient Japanese producers and 
substantial over-capacity resulting from new investments. 
Between 1986 and 1991 new car registrations in the EC 
rose annually by 2.4% on average. Over the last two years, 
they fell by 25% while production continued to expand. 
The Community manufacturers' share of the home market, 
which stood at about 90% in 1991, will in the long term 
come under pressure as a result of the planned complete lib-
eralisation of trade with Japan by the year 2000. 
For the near future, a substantial increase in over-capacity is 
possible, not only because of increased market penetration by 
Japanese firms but also because some EC manufacturers are 
pushing ahead with investment plans in the EC conceived in 
the booming 1980s. Furthermore, production is being relo-
cated outside the Community, attracted by low labour costs 
and growing markets, particularly in Eastern Europe. 
The declining competitiveness of European carmakers has 
significant effects on employment. For example, Volkswa-
gen, the market leader, is planning to shed 33.000 jobs worl-
dwide over the next two years, and Mercedes-Benz cut 
13.000 jobs in Germany alone last year. Other industries are 
also affected because the car industry is an important factor 
of demand for upstream and downstream industries and ser-
vices : it is estimated that 10% of Community employment 
depends thus on the car industry. As new production tech-
niques such as just-in-time-delivery are introduced, plants 
abroad are increasingly served by local components manu-
facturers, thus reducing orders for EC component suppliers. 
These developments may also have a negative impact on the 
EC's trade balance. 
Because Japanese carmakers are producing more efficient-
ly than their EC counterparts, their entrance into the Euro-
pean market will force EC carmakers to increase productiv-
ity and product quality. Thus, the entrance of Japanese 
carmakers will eventually contribute to greater efficiency 
if European carmakers face up to the challenge. In the 
Commission's view, excessive reliance on subsidies to 
solve the industry's problems could undermine these 
healthy effects of foreign competition. 
The Commission's sectoral guidelines I reflect these con-
cerns. All cases of aid to this sector must be individually ap-
proved by the Commission. Investment aid may be permitted 
in assisted regions if the Commission considers that the re-
gional benefits outweigh any possible adverse effects on the 
sector as a whole (resulting, for example, from an increase in 
total production capacity). Outside the assisted regions, the 
Commission will approve investment aid only in very excep-
tional circumstances and on condition that the aided project 
does not lead to an increase in production capacity. 
As far as restructuring aid to this sector is concerned, the 
Commission follows its usual practice of requiring the irre-
versible reduction of production capacity as a condition for 
its approval. In 1988, for example, the Commission al-
lowed the French government, sole owner of Renault, to 
write off FF 12 billion of Renault's debts in return for sev-
eral commitments regarding the production capacity and 
legal status of Renault. When the agreed cuts in the firm's 
production capacity were delayed, the Commission or-
dered the carmaker to repay over two thirds of the aid, a 
proportion which was finally reduced to one half after 
lengthy negotiations. 
The Shipbuilding Industry 
The capacity extensions of the 1970s and the subsequent 
oversupply of ships in the recession of the early 1980s have 
led to the loss of 2/3 of the jobs in the Community industry 
since 1975. 
The world market in shipbuilding is dominated by Japan 
(38%), followed by the European Community (23%) and 
Korea ( 15% ). European producers face severe competition 
from lower-priced ships built in Asia. Between 1986 and 
1989 the EC steadily increased its share in world produc-
tion from 19.7% to 23.7%. However, in 1991, Community 
production declined faster than world production so that 
the EC's share in the world market was down to 23%. New 
orders have also declined faster in the Community (31 % ) 
than internationally (16.7% ). 
However, prices have been rising since 1986 despite the over-
capacity. A stable equilibrium seems possible if prices con-
tinue to rise and there are no additions to capacity. The Com-
munity is leading internationally in some market segments 
with high value-added where modem production technol-
ogies and R&D are of crucial importance. 
National aids to the shipbuilding industry in the Community 
amounted to about 1.8 billion ECU per year in the period 
1988-1990, or 5% of all state aid granted to manufacturing 
during that period. As a proportion of value added in the in-
dustry, the level of aid in the Community as a whole has re-
mained stable at about 33% since 1986. However, aid levels 
were much higher in Italy (85% ), Portugal (79%) and France 
(55% ). The lowest levels were observed in the U.K. (11 % ), 
Greece (13%) and Belgium ( 14% ). 
An argument that has sometimes been put forward in favour 
of aid to shipbuilding yards is that a decline in demand maybe 
particularly devastating to yards which have invested most 
heavily in recent years in new equipment. When the market 
is in equilibrium these yards are the most cost-efficient and 
1 
"Community framework on state aid to the motor vehicle industry", 
O.J. n"C 123 of 18.5.1989. 
-12-
best able to compete successfully in the world market. How-
ever, such firms have higher fixed costs and, if unable to ex-
ploit economies of scale in a depressed market, will suffer 
greater losses than their competitors using old-fashioned 
techniques. Consequently, a long period of depressed de-
mand could result in the closure of modem, technologically 
advanced shipyards, weakening the Community's ability to 
take advantage of an upturn in the market. 
There is a wide-spread suspicion that the low prices of Asian 
competitors are not entirely due to indigenous production ad-
vantages but may be partly the result of production subsidies. 
The structure of the shipping sector is such that normal trade 
policy measures, such as anti-dumping procedures, are inef-
fective for dealing with this problem. Consequently, Com-
munity policy towards operating (production) aids has been 
much more lenient in this sector than in other sectors. 
Since 1969 state aid to shipbuilding has been the subject of 
a series of Council directives. It is now governed by the 
Seventh Directive 1, which expires at the end of this year. 
The Commission is allowed to authorise operating aid sub-
Council Directive n° 90/684 EEC of 21 December 1990. O.J. n" L 
380 of 31.12.1990, as amended by Council Directive n" 92/68/EEC 
of 20 July 1992. O.J. n° L 219 of 4.8.1992. 
ject to a common upper limit that is established annually 
by the Commission as percentage of the contract value of 
the ships before the aid and is to be reduced progressively. 
The ceiling takes account of the cost difference between the 
Community's most competitive yards and their main in-
ternational rivals. Since 1987 this ceiling has been reduced 
progressively for most ships from 28% to 9% and for small 
vessels from 20% to 4.5%. No operating aid is allowed for 
ship repairing. The East German shipyards benefit from a 
special derogation from these provisions on condition that 
their total capacity be reduced by 40% by the end of 1995. 
As in other industries, Community policy has to address the 
problem of over-capacity in the shipbuilding sector: any kind 
of investment aid must therefore be linked to a restructuring 
plan which does not involve any increase in the shipbuilding 
capacity of a yard, unless there is a corresponding reduction 
in the capacity of other yards in the same Member State. 
Aid towards costs arising from the partial or complete clo-
sure of a yard may also be authorised if the capacity reduc-
tion is "genuine and irreversible". The eligible costs in-
clude redundancy compensation, early retirement pensions 
and investment in converting shipyards to other uses. 
Principal economic policy measures - March 1994 
Community (EUR-12) 
21.3. ECOFIN Council examines and gives a favourable reaction to Den-
mark's convergence programme. 
23.3 European Commission approves the Annual Economic Report for 
1994. 
Belgium (B) 
1.3. The central bank reduces its central rate from 6.40% to 6.25'/r and 
cuts the rate on advances within the ceiling from 7.90%, to 7.757,. 
9.3. The central bank reduces its central rate from 6.25% to 6.15'/c and 
cuts its rate on advances within the ceiling from 7.75o/c to 7.65%. 
25.3. The government concludes the budgetary review for 1994 without 
having to take new austerity measures. It corrects the BFR 17 billion over-
run by increasing the amount obtained from realizing assets from 
BFR 40 billion to BFR 57 billion. 
30.3. The central hank lowers its central rate from 6.15% to 6.05% and its 
rate on advances within the ceiling from 7.65% to 7.55'X:. 
Denmark (DK) 
None. 
Germany (D) 
None. 
Greece (GR) 
4 .3. The government takes measures to implement the 1994 budget that 
involve raising budget revenues of DR 400 billion from tax arrears. 
IU. The government takes over DR 500 hill ion in debt from the Agricul-
tural Bank of Greece, increasing public sector debt by the same amount. 
15.3. Interest rates on one-year Treasury hills are reduced by 25 basis 
points to 18.75%. 
31.3. Interest rates on one-year Treasury bills are reduced hy 25 basis 
points to 18.50'/c. 
Spain (E) 
3.3. Bank of Spain cuts the minimum intervention rate by 50 basis points 
to 8% (5 percentage points lower than a year earlier). 
France (F) 
14.3. The government adopts plans to increase military expenditure by 
O.So/c per year in volume terms over the period 19()5- 2000. l;nder the five-
year law on public finance consolidation. primary budgetary outlays should 
decrease by 0.6c/c- per year in volume terms. 
24.3. The Monetary Policy Council of the Banque de France cuts its inter-
vention rate from 6. I% to 6';( . 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
None. 
Luxembourg (L) 
8.3. The Tripartite (the government and the two sides of industr)) con-
cludes an intersectoral social agreement aimed at stemming the rise of un-
employment, the growth of intlation and the loss of husinec" competitive-
ness. The trade union organizations undertake to moderate their wage 
demands and to take account of the need to boost productivity. In return. the 
employers undertake to maintain, or even to increase. the level of employ-
ment. Another measure is designed to restore business competitiveness. 
namely the scrapping of the special contribution equal to 1.7'/c of a firm's 
wage bill, which helped to strengthen the finances of the social security sys-
tem. A special tax on motor fuels (petrol and diesel) is introduced to make 
up for this revenue shortfall, but the higher prices will not be reflected in the 
consumer price index and will not therefore affect the growth of wages. 
which will continue to be adjusted on the basis of the sliding-scale system 
(auton1atic wage indexation). 
Netherlands (NL) 
None. 
Portugal ( P) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
None. 
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